Members of the appeals court
The Court of Appeal has overturned the murder conviction and death sentence of Mariama Conteh, who had been found guilty of killing her partner, Tijan Bah, in 2014, following a ruling by Justice E.O. Dada J. In a landmark decision on February 25, 2025, the Court declared the trial a “nullity” due to significant procedural errors.
Conteh had been accused of fatally stabbing Tijan Bah after a violent dispute over money to pay for their daughter’s medical treatment. Evidence presented during the trial confirmed that Conteh and Bah had been in a relationship and shared a child. The altercation occurred at Bah’s residence in Bakau.
The prosecution called eight witnesses, including Bah’s mother, who testified as an eyewitness. Conteh, however, testified in her defense as the sole witness.
According to the evidence, on October 1, 2024, Conteh visited Bah’s home to ask for money to purchase medication for their sick child. The conversation turned into an argument when Bah refused to provide the funds, which escalated into a physical altercation. During the altercation, Bah was fatally stabbed, leading to Conteh’s subsequent charge, trial, and conviction.
Conteh appealed her conviction and sentence on several grounds:
- The trial judge erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the case in the Superior Court (Trial High Court). It was argued that the testimony of the expert medical doctor (a dentist) was inconsistent with the age determination report, and that the inconsistencies in the doctor’s testimony were not resolved in her favor, with the appellant (Conteh) being a minor at the time of the incident.
- The trial judge incorrectly concluded that Conteh had murdered Bah, relying heavily on Exhibit A (a second cautionary statement from Conteh), which was deemed inadmissible.
- The judge failed to adequately evaluate the witness testimonies, leading to an incorrect conclusion. The appellant’s defense argued that there were unresolved doubts within the prosecution’s evidence that were not resolved in her favor.
- The trial judge misdirected himself by finding that the prosecution had proven the charge of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. It was argued that the prosecution failed to establish all necessary elements of murder, making the trial court’s decision unreasonable and resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
Conteh sought the following reliefs from the Court of Appeal: a declaration that she was a minor at the time of the incident, a ruling that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to try her, and an order to overturn and set aside her conviction and sentence. Alternatively, she requested an immediate release from custody rather than remitting the case for retrial in the children’s court, noting that she had already spent 10 years in detention.
The case faced delays due to the prosecution’s failure to file the required legal documents on time, stemming from issues in preparing the Records of Proceedings from the trial court. On October 21, 2024, the Court ordered both parties to submit their briefs of argument. Conteh filed hers on November 5, 2024, but the State did not submit theirs. Principal State Counsel A. A. Wakawa informed the Court on December 16, 2024, that the Ministry of Justice had been affected by the loss of one of their lawyers, which hindered the filing of their brief.
The Court noted that since the State failed to submit its brief, it was not obligated to hear the State’s arguments orally. The Court emphasized that, according to the law, the failure of the Respondent (the State) to file their brief effectively amounted to an admission of everything in the appellant’s brief, making them bound by the outcome of the appeal.
A pivotal issue in the case was Conteh’s age at the time of the crime. The Court ruled that Conteh was approximately 17 years old when the incident occurred, meaning the trial had taken place in a court that lacked jurisdiction. As a result, the proceedings were deemed invalid, and the conviction and death sentence were overturned.
The Court concluded that the trial was a nullity for several reasons: the indictment against Conteh before the High Court was invalid, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over a minor, and the trial judge’s failure to conduct an inquiry to determine Conteh’s true age rendered the proceedings void.
“A nullity in law is a void act, an act which has no legal consequence, and it is an act that is not only bad, but as LORD DENNING L.J. stated in UAC LTD V MACFOY (1961) 3 All ER 169, “is incurably bad”. It is as if nothing happened,”
Justice N. Salla Wadda ruled that the trial of the appellant, Mariama Conteh, was entirely null and void. As a result, she allowed the appeal, overturned the murder conviction, and set aside the death sentence previously imposed on the appellant.
She emphasized that since the trial had been deemed a nullity, it would be neither legally prudent nor necessary to examine the other issues raised in the appeal. Doing so, she explained, would amount to a purely academic exercise with no meaningful impact on the justice of the case.
“In my considered view where a trial has been declared a nullity because the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter, the proper verdict to return is to quash the conviction and sentence and then discharge the accused,”.
She further stated that, from another perspective, the appropriate course of action would be to order a retrial, which falls within the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. However, she noted that it is a well-established legal principle that a retrial in a criminal case is not automatic when the original trial has been declared a nullity.
The justification for ordering a retrial in such cases is rooted in ensuring justice, particularly when the facts indicate that allowing the appellant to walk free could result in a miscarriage of justice. This is especially relevant when the evidence suggests that an offence was committed, and given the severity of the crime.
She explained that, in general, a retrial would not be ordered if the appellant had been acquitted in the initial trial, as this serves as a safeguard against double jeopardy.
Furthermore, she pointed out that a considerable amount of time has elapsed since the original trial commenced and questioned whether the evidence and exhibits presented at the time would still be available.
She also stressed that the appellant, Mariama, has been in prison custody since October 2014—nearly eleven years—despite being charged, tried, and convicted by a court that lacked the jurisdiction to do so.
“If a retrial order is made, the appellant, who should now be around 27 or 28 years old, will need to be tried before the Children’s Court because her maternal age at the time of the offence was approximately 17 years or younger. Given the lengthy period since October 2014, will the availability of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defence not pose a challenge?”
She acknowledged the significant time required to initiate and complete a second trial, along with the financial burden associated with a retrial.
Wadda reflected on whether subjecting the appellant to another criminal trial would constitute an additional ordeal and suffering—one she should not have to endure through no fault of her own.
She also considered the passage of time between the alleged offence in October 2014 and a potential retrial—nearly eleven years—and questioned whether pursuing the case again would serve the public interest.
Taking judicial notice of the prevalence of murder cases in the country and recognizing the necessity of retrials for individuals whose convictions have been overturned due to technical errors, she carefully weighed all relevant circumstances. These included the appellant’s age at the time of the alleged offence, the manner in which the investigation, trial, conviction, and sentencing were conducted, her continuous detention since October 2014, the duration a retrial might take, challenges in securing witnesses and evidence, the time and financial implications of a retrial, and the likelihood that, due to her age at the time of the alleged offence, she could only be retried before the Children’s Court.
“I am swayed to refrain from ordering a retrial. Therefore, I find and hold that justice in this case requires that an order of retrial ought not to be made so hold,” Justice Wadda held.She further determined that the appellant was a minor at the time of the incident and concluded that the trial judge lacked the jurisdiction to prosecute or convict the appellant.
“I further find and hold on the basis of the foregoing that the trial of the Appellant was a nullity ab initio and the judgment of the court below premised on that trial was consequently a complete nullity as well. I also find and hold that a retrial of the Appellant is not in the interest of justice given the circumstances of this case and I hereby order that the Appellant be released from prison custody of the State Central Prisons forthwith,” She ruled.
Mariama Conteh, who had been in custody since 2014, was ordered to be released immediately.
Justice Amina Saho Ceesay, in support of the ruling, stressed that fairness and the right to a speedy trial made a retrial unjust.
In a joint opinion, Justices Ceesay and Basiru V.P. Mahoney concurred that a retrial was unwarranted, citing the prolonged delay and weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.
This decision marks a pivotal moment in discussions on juvenile justice and trial integrity, underscoring the need for proper age determination and adherence to jurisdictional rules to ensure fair trials for minors.